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Regulating Patent Assertions
Paul R. Gugliuzza
In recent years, a small number of patent holders, often called “bottom feeder”
patent trolls, have been abusing the U.S. patent system. These patent holders blanket
the country with thousands of letters demanding that the recipients purchase a license
for a few thousand dollars or else face an infringement suit. The letters are usually sent
to small businesses and nonprofits that do not have the resources to defend against
claims of patent infringement. And the letters often contain false or misleading
statements designed to scare the recipient into purchasing a license without
investigating the merits of the allegations. In response to this troubling behavior,
legislatures in over thirty states have enacted statutes that outlaw assertions of patent
infringement that are deceptive, false, or made in bad faith.
These statutes, however, may be unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, which has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals in patent cases, has
held that patent holders are immune from civil claims challenging acts of patent
enforcement unless the patent holder knew its infringement allegations were
objectively baseless. This rule provides patent holders with nearly complete immunity
from liability under the new statutes. In fact, the rule has already immunized two
notorious bottom feeders, Innovatio IP Ventures and MPHJ Technology Investments,
from liability under state consumer protection and deceptive trade practices laws.
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Although the Federal Circuit has sometimes called the immunity afforded to
patent holders a matter of the federal Patent Act’s “preemption” of state law, the court’s
immunity doctrine also appears to limit the ability of the federal government to regulate
patent enforcement behavior. This is because the Federal Circuit’s decisions are not
grounded in the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which is the usual source of
preemption doctrine, but in the First Amendment right to petition the government.
Unlike the Supremacy Clause, the First Amendment restricts the power of the federal
government, not just state governments. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit’s immunity
doctrine also limits the ability of the Federal Trade Commission to bring unfair
competition proceedings against patent trolls and may thwart Congress’s efforts to
outlaw false or misleading statements made in patent demand letters.
This chapter makes two main arguments. First, the Federal Circuit’s immunity
doctrine is wrong as a matter of law, policy, and historical practice. Until the Federal
Circuit adopted its “objective baselessness” requirement, courts had, for nearly a
century, held that patent enforcement conduct could be declared unlawful if it was
simply “in bad faith.” That flexible, equity-based immunity standard struck an
appropriate balance between the goals of punishing extortionate schemes of patent
enforcement and respecting patent holders’ rights to make legitimate allegations of
infringement. But the Federal Circuit has abandoned that standard in the misguided
belief that letters between private parties, such as demand letters sent by patent
holders to alleged infringers, are protected by the First Amendment right to petition the
government. If the Federal Circuit reversed course in future cases, both state
governments and the federal government would be able to regulate letters that use
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deceptive or false statements to intimidate recipients into purchasing a license, even if
the infringement allegations in the letters are not objectively baseless.
Second, state governments and the federal government should share
responsibility for regulating patent demand letters. Although patents are usually
thought to be a matter for the federal government, not the states, the states have long
regulated unfair and deceptive trade practices resembling the demand letters sent by
bottom-feeder trolls. State governments also offer critical enforcement resources. They
are more accessible to the small businesses, nonprofits, and local governments likely to
be targeted by deceptive campaigns of patent enforcement, and the quantity of
enforcement actions that could be pursued by numerous states’ attorneys general likely
dwarfs what the federal government could do. At the same time, federal legislation on
patent demand letters would provide a uniform standard for assessing the legality of
patent enforcement conduct. Federal legislation could also clarify difficult jurisdictional
issues that arise in disputes over the lawfulness of patent assertions.
Ideally, the Federal Circuit will loosen its requirement of objective baselessness,
which would allow Congress to pass a statute that: (1) outlaws demand letters sent in
bad faith, (2) preempts state laws regulating patent enforcement, (3) permits both state
governments and private plaintiffs to enforce the federal statute, and (4) grants the
federal courts expansive personal jurisdiction in cases arising under the statute.
Finally, an introductory note about the scope of this chapter: The chapter focuses
primarily on unfair or deceptive assertions of patent infringement made in demand
letters, for it is those demand letters that have provided the impetus for both state and
federal efforts to regulate patent assertions. It should be emphasized, however, that the
Federal Circuit's immunity doctrine shields patent holders not only when their
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infringement assertions are made in demand letters but also when they file
infringement lawsuits in court. Emerging evidence indicates that, although some bottom
feeders rely on demand letters alone, many patent holders seeking nuisance-value
licenses file lawsuits in addition to (or instead of) sending demand letters (Federal
Trade Commission 2016, 4-5). Because the same immunity doctrine applies both to
letters and to lawsuits, many of this chapter's critiques of Federal Circuit law could be
extended to campaigns that involve litigation in court. That said, future scholarship
might also consider whether differences between demand letters and infringement
complaints, including the fact that infringement complaints might be more plausibly
viewed as petitions to the government within the meaning of the First Amendment,
warrant an immunity doctrine that accounts for the context in which infringement
assertions are made.

6.1 The Problem: Bottom-Feeder Patent Trolls
In the past decade, scholars and policymakers have fixated on “patent trolls” or,
less pejoratively, non-practicing entities (NPEs) (see generally Cotropia et al. 2014).
NPEs are often criticized because they do not manufacture products or provide services.
Instead, they exist primarily to enforce patents. But the NPE business model is not
necessarily nefarious. Research universities, for example, usually cannot commercialize
the patents obtained by their faculty, so they license the technology to others and
sometimes sue for infringement. NPEs can also help monetize inventions by those who
cannot afford to assert their patents in litigation, such as individual inventors and startup companies.
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In the past few years, however, a species of “bottom feeder” trolls has emerged.
These patent holders send out hundreds or thousands of demand letters at one time,
relying on the high cost of patent litigation in the hope of eliciting a nuisance-value
settlement, that is, a settlement payment less than the amount it would cost to
investigate the infringement allegations (Lemley and Melamed 2013, 2126). Bottom
feeders target small businesses, nonprofits, and even local governments, knowing that
those organizations are unfamiliar with patent litigation and likely cannot afford to
defend against infringement claims (Chien and Reines 2014, 235).
One well-known bottom feeder is the company MPHJ Technology Investments. In
2012 and 2013, MPHJ sent letters to over 16,000 small businesses throughout the
United States. The letters accused the recipients of infringing a patent that covers the
use of an office scanner to send documents via email. MPHJ demanded that each
recipient purchase a license for about a thousand dollars per employee or else face an
infringement suit in federal court.
Another bottom feeder who has engaged in a mass enforcement campaign is
Innovatio IP Ventures. Beginning in 2011, Innovatio sent letters to over 8,000
businesses throughout the United States, including bakeries, hotels, and restaurants,
claiming that those businesses infringed its patents by providing customers with
wireless Internet access. Innovatio demanded that the recipients purchase licenses for
about $2500 each or risk being sued for patent infringement.
The demand letters sent in these mass enforcement campaigns are often rife
with false or deceptive statements (Gugliuzza 2015, 1582). MPHJ, for instance, obscured
its identity by sending letters through eighty-one shell companies with nonsensical
names such as DolVol, GanPan, and JitNom. To intimidate recipients into quickly
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purchasing a license, MPHJ threatened to sue if the recipient did not respond within two
weeks. But, in fact, MPHJ never sued any of the targets of its mass enforcement
campaign. Likewise, both Innovatio and MPHJ falsely claimed that many other
businesses had already purchased licenses to their patents.

6.2 Governments Respond
In response to the tactics of patent holders such as Innovatio and MPHJ, both
state governments and the federal government have become interested in regulating
patent assertions.

6.2.1 State Statutes and State Law Enforcement Actions
Since 2013, legislatures in over thirty states have adopted statutes outlawing
deceptive, false, or bad faith assertions of patent infringement (Patent Progress 2016).
Statutes outlawing particular acts of patent enforcement are actually nothing new. In
1883, the British Parliament created a “threats action” – a civil claim that could be
pursued by persons targeted with groundless threats of suit for patent infringement
(U.K. Law Commission 2014). The United States patent laws, however, have never
provided such a claim. Rather, a statute passed in Vermont in May 2013 was the first in
the United States to condemn specific acts of patent enforcement.
Through August 2016, twenty-one states have adopted statutes modeled after
Vermont’s, with some minor variations. The core provision of the Vermont statute
states simply: “A person shall not make a bad faith assertion of patent infringement” (Vt.
Stat. Ann., tit. 9, § 4197(a)). The statute then lists several factors that courts “may
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consider . . . as evidence that a person has made a bad faith assertion of patent
infringement” (id. § 4197(b)), including:
•

The demand letter does not contain: the patent number, the name and
address of the patent holder, or “factual allegations concerning the
specific areas in which the target’s products, services, and technology
infringe the patent.”

•

The demand letter lacks the information described above, the target
requests the information, and the patent holder fails to provide the
information “within a reasonable amount of time.”

•

The patent holder has previously filed or threatened to file lawsuits
and those threats lacked the information described above or were
found by a court to be meritless.

•

Prior to sending the demand letter, the patent holder did not conduct
an analysis comparing the claims of the patent to the target’s
products, services, or technology, “or such an analysis was done but
does not identify specific areas in which the products, services, and
technology are covered by the claims in the patent.”

•

The demand letter demands payment of a license or a response
“within an unreasonably short period of time.”

•

The patent holder “offers to license the patent for an amount that is
not based on a reasonable estimate of the value of the license.”

•

“The claim or assertion of patent infringement is meritless, and the
person knew, or should have known, that the claim or assertion is
meritless.”
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•

“The claim or assertion of patent infringement is deceptive.”

As these factors suggest, the primary aims of the statute are to ensure that patent
demand letters provide accused infringers with specific information about the alleged
infringement and to deter patent holders from engaging in deceptive conduct in the
hope of eliciting nuisance-value settlements.
In addition to the Vermont model, two other types of state patent-demand-letter
statutes exist. In April 2014, Wisconsin became the third state, after Vermont and
Oregon, to pass a statute regulating patent enforcement. (Oregon’s statute is similar to
Vermont’s.) The Wisconsin statute, which, unlike the widely copied Vermont statute,
has not been followed in any other state, outlines in detail the information that a
demand letter must include, such as the name of the patent owner, an identification of
each patent claim being asserted, an identification of the allegedly infringing product or
service, and “[f]actual allegations and an analysis setting forth in detail” the patent
holder’s theory of infringement (Wis. Stat. § 100.197(2)(a)). The Wisconsin statute can
be violated in two ways: First, if the letter lacks any of the required information, the
target may notify the sender that the letter is incomplete. If the sender does not provide
the missing information within thirty days, the sender violates the statute (id.
§ 100.197(2)(c)). Second, a demand letter violates the Wisconsin statute if it “contain[s]
false, misleading, or deceptive information” (id. § 100.197(2)(b)).
A third and final model of state legislation has been adopted in eight states.
Rather than prohibiting false or bad faith assertions of patent infringement, these
statutes outline specific acts or omissions that violate the statute, such as “falsely
stat[ing] that litigation has been filed” against the recipient, seeking compensation for
infringement of a patent that has been held invalid or has expired, or failing to include
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“factual allegations concerning the specific areas in which the [recipient’s] products . . .
infringe[] the patent” (e.g., Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 112(A)). The statutes also make clear that
it is not unlawful to notify others of or to seek compensation for patent infringement, so
long as the patent owner “is not acting in bad faith” (e.g., id. § 112(B)).
All of the state statutes provide for enforcement by state officials, such as the
state attorney general, and most of the statutes create a private right of action for the
targets of unlawful infringement assertions. The remedies available in those private
suits include equitable relief, compensatory damages, treble damages, and attorneys’
fees (see Gugliuzza 2015, 1593–1594, 1596 n.107, 1598 n.117).
In addition to these new state statutes, attorneys general in several states have
begun to use their powers under consumer protection and deceptive trade practices
laws to challenge patent enforcement campaigns (id. pp. 1599–1600). Vermont’s
attorney general, for instance, sued MPHJ in May 2013, alleging that the company’s
demand letters violated Vermont’s general consumer protection statute. (The suit was
filed two weeks before Vermont’s demand letter statute took effect.) Around the same
time, the attorney general of Nebraska began an investigation into whether a law firm
representing MPHJ and Activision TV, another NPE, had violated Nebraska’s consumer
protection and deceptive trade practices statutes. As discussed below, however, the
Federal Circuit’s immunity doctrine may render these law enforcement actions
unconstitutional.

6.2.2 Federal Efforts to Regulate Patent Assertions
At the federal level, both Congress and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
have shown interest in regulating patent assertions. In 2014, the FTC filed an
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administrative complaint against MPHJ alleging that the company engaged in deceptive
trade practices in violation of the Federal Trade Commission Act. MPHJ settled the case
by agreeing to refrain from making deceptive statements when asserting its patent
rights in the future (Consent Order 2014). The FTC has also used its subpoena power to
investigate patent trolls in an attempt to obtain information about how they operate,
issuing an extensive report just as this chapter was going to press (FTC 2016).
In addition, Congress has begun to contemplate legislation that would regulate
patent assertions. A bill recently introduced in the House of Representatives, the
Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act, defines no fewer than seventeen types
of communications related to alleged patent infringement as unfair or deceptive acts
under the FTC Act. Among other things, the bill would make it unlawful to, “in bad faith”:
fail to include a description of how the recipient infringes the patent, state that “legal
action for infringement of the patent will be taken against the recipient,” claim that
“persons other than the recipient purchased a license for the patent asserted,” or allege
that “an investigation of the recipient’s alleged infringement occurred” (TROL Act §
2(a)).
Similarly, a bill recently introduced in the Senate, the Protecting American Talent
and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act, would outlaw at least eight specific actions taken
by persons who engage in “widespread sending” of demand letters, including: engaging
in a pattern of falsely threatening infringement litigation; making statements related to
patent validity, enforceability, or infringement that “lack a reasonable basis in fact or
law”; or sending letters “likely to materially mislead a reasonable recipient” because the
letters do not contain information about the patent holder, the asserted patent, or the
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recipient’s alleged infringement (PATENT Act § 9(a)). Under the bill, the FTC would
enforce these prohibitions (id.).
The TROL Act has made progress in the House. The initial version was approved
by a subcommittee in 2014, and, in 2015, the full committee on Commerce,
Manufacturing, and Trade approved a revised version of the bill. But that committee
vote was entirely along party lines, and observers have criticized key aspects of the bill,
including its express preemption of state statutes regulating patent assertions and its
potential intrusion on patent holders’ First Amendment rights (see Gugliuzza 2015,
1614 n.213, 1637 n.352). Thus, the prospects for Congressional action to regulate
patent assertions seem questionable at best.

6.3 Constitutional Limits on Regulating Patent
Assertions
Under current law, opponents of the TROL Act may be correct that the bill
violates the First Amendment. The Federal Circuit has held that patent holders are
immune from liability based on their enforcement actions unless the patent holder’s
allegations of infringement were objectively baseless and the patent holder knew those
allegations were objectively baseless. This broad immunity rule, however, misinterprets
the relevant constitutional provisions and wrongly vitiates courts’ long-standing power
to condemn acts of patent enforcement that are undertaken, simply, in bad faith.

6.3.1 Judicially Created Immunity for Patent Holders
For decades, persons accused of patent infringement have tried to assert civil
claims against overzealous patent holders. Those claims are sometimes grounded in
11

state law (for example, claims for unfair competition or for tortious interference with
business relations) and other times grounded in federal law (for example, claims for
unfair competition under the Lanham Act or for violations of the civil RICO statute). The
Federal Circuit, however, has held that patent holders are mostly immune from civil
liability for their enforcement behavior. According to the Federal Circuit, to strip a
patent holder of immunity, the plaintiff must prove not only the elements of its claim, it
must also prove, by clear and convincing evidence, (1) that the patent holder’s
infringement allegations were “objectively baseless,” meaning that no reasonable
litigant could have expected to succeed, and (2) that the patent holder made its
infringement allegations with knowledge of their inaccuracy or with reckless disregard
for their accuracy (Globetrotter 2004, 1377).
Courts and commentators sometimes call the immunity enjoyed by patent
holders a matter of “preemption” because it is most frequently invoked when an alleged
infringer relies on state law, such as the law of torts or unfair competition, to challenge a
patent holder’s behavior in enforcing a federal patent (see, e.g., Hunter Douglas 1998,
1338; Johnson 2014, 2027). The term “preemption” suggests that the source of the
immunity doctrine is the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which limits only the power
of state governments, not the federal government. In more recent cases, however, the
Federal Circuit has made clear that its immunity doctrine stems not from the
Supremacy Clause alone, but also from the First Amendment, which does limit the
power of the federal government. In Globetrotter, for instance, the court wrote: “Our
decision to permit state-law tort liability for only objectively baseless allegations of
infringement rests on both federal preemption and the First Amendment” (Globetrotter
2004, 1377).
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The Federal Circuit’s two-element test for stripping patent holders of immunity
is drawn from U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the Noerr-Pennington doctrine of
antitrust law. That doctrine protects the First Amendment right to petition the
government by immunizing defendants from antitrust liability based their pursuit of
litigation unless the litigation was a “sham” (Noerr 1961; Pennington 1965). To
establish that litigation was a sham, the plaintiff must show that the defendant’s lawsuit
was both objectively baseless and filed with the subjective intent to impair competition
(Professional Real Estate Investors 1993, 60–61). The Federal Circuit has explicitly
cited the Supreme Court’s test for establishing sham litigation as the basis of its test for
stripping a patent holder of immunity from civil liability for patent enforcement
activities (Globetrotter 2004, 1376).
Under the Noerr-based test the Federal Circuit has articulated for stripping
patent holders of immunity, most tactics employed by bottom-feeder trolls cannot serve
as the basis for civil liability. Because the test requires a plaintiff to show that the patent
holder’s infringement allegations were objectively baseless, false statements about
matters peripheral to the infringement claims, such as misrepresentations about how
many other persons have purchased licenses to the patents, will not strip a patent
holder of immunity (see, e.g., Innovatio 2013, 922; Activision TV 2014, 13). Moreover, it
is very difficult to prove that infringement allegations were objectively baseless. The
issue of infringement often turns on the judge’s interpretation of the patent’s claims.
Those decisions are notoriously unpredictable (Burk and Lemley 2009, 1744–1746),
making it hard to say that any given infringement allegation was so unlikely to succeed
that it was objectively baseless. Also, an accused infringer who seeks to show that a
patent is invalid must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence (Microsoft
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2011, 2242). Thus, even if a patent probably does not satisfy validity requirements such
as novelty and nonobviousness, a patent holder could still have some probability of
success, which is sufficient under Federal Circuit law to immunize the patent holder
from liability. An extensive survey of Federal Circuit cases applying its immunity rule
confirms that it is extremely rare for a plaintiff to prevail on a claim challenging patent
enforcement conduct (Gugliuzza 2015, 1627 n.299).
In fact, two federal district courts have already relied on the Federal Circuit’s
immunity doctrine to shelter the bottom-feeders Innovatio and MPHJ (Innovatio 2013;

Activision TV 2014). After Innovatio began its enforcement campaign against users of
wireless Internet routers, the manufacturers of the routers (Cisco, Motorola, and
Netgear) sued Innovatio, asserting a claim under the federal RICO statute and several
claims under California state law. The complaint alleged that Innovatio had made
numerous false statements in its letters, including statements that it had “successfully
licensed thousands of business locations under the . . . patents” and that “the validity of
many claims of the . . . patents ha[d] been confirmed by both the Federal Circuit and the
United States Patent Office, via both judicial and re-examination proceedings”
(Innovatio 2013, 920–921). On Innovatio’s motion to dismiss, the court accepted the
plaintiffs’ allegations as true but still dismissed the complaint. Although the plaintiffs
alleged that Innovatio had lied in its demand letters, the court reasoned that Innovatio
was immune from civil liability because the plaintiffs did not plead that Innovatio’s
infringement claims were objectively baseless, as the Federal Circuit requires.
Likewise, a federal district court in Nebraska enjoined that state’s attorney
general from pursuing a state-law case against MPHJ because the attorney general did
not allege that MPHJ’s theories of validity and infringement were objectively baseless.
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The attorney general argued that MPHJ made “false and misleading representations” in
its demand letters, such as statements that many businesses had already purchased a
license and that it intended to sue recipients who did not purchase a license. But the
court held that to strip MPHJ of immunity, the attorney general had to allege that MPHJ’s
theories of validity and infringement were objectively baseless, which the attorney
general had not done.
In short, it is not hyperbole to say that, under the Federal Circuit’s immunity
doctrine, patent holders have a “legal right to lie” in their demand letters (Seidenberg
2014). It is these (legally protected) lies that motivate increased interest by both state
governments and the federal government in curbing certain patent enforcement tactics.

6.3.2 Rethinking the Federal Circuit’s Immunity Doctrine
Although it is difficult for a plaintiff to prove that an allegation of patent
infringement was objectively baseless, it is not a foregone conclusion that patent
holders’ claims of immunity will always succeed. To the extent that challenges to patent
enforcement conduct proceed in state court, such as the Vermont attorney general’s suit
against MPHJ, those courts could develop a narrower immunity rule than the Federal
Circuit, for state courts are not bound to follow Federal Circuit law.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit could – and should – reconsider its case law, as
there is a strong argument that the court has erred in granting patent holders broad
immunity for their enforcement conduct. As noted, the Federal Circuit derived its
immunity test from antitrust law’s Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which protects
defendants from antitrust liability based on their litigation conduct in order to preserve
the First Amendment right “to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” But
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the Federal Circuit’s reliance on Noerr-Pennington and the First Amendment’s Petition
Clause is a mistake. Most fundamentally, letters sent from one private party to another,
such as letters threatening patent infringement litigation, are simply not “petition[s]” to
“the government” within the meaning of the First Amendment. Moreover, the holding in

Noerr was “a construction of the Sherman Act” informed by the Act’s purpose to
regulate “business activity,” not political activity or litigation conduct (Noerr 1961, 137–
138; see also California Motor Transport 1972 (extending Noerr immunity to litigation
conduct)). But this statutory rationale for immunity from antitrust liability is absent in
the context of patent enforcement. In contrast to the antitrust laws, the regulation of
litigation conduct or misleading assertions of legal rights is a core purpose of laws used
to challenge patent enforcement, such as consumer protection laws and the new state
patent-assertion statutes.
By looking to history, the Federal Circuit could better balance the goals of
protecting patent holders from liability when they make legitimate allegations of
infringement and punishing patent holders when they employ unfair or deceptive
tactics. At the time the Federal Circuit was created in 1982, the lower federal courts had,
for nearly a century, been addressing the precise question of when a patent holder
could be held liable for its enforcement conduct. Those courts enjoined patent holders
from making infringement assertions “in bad faith” (see, e.g., Emack 1888) – precisely
the behavior many of the new state statutes condemn. But the Federal Circuit has
largely ignored that long line of decisions, instead demanding that anyone challenging
patent enforcement conduct prove that the infringement allegations were objectively
baseless (Gugliuzza 2015, 1624–27).
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Historically, the courts treated bad faith as a flexible standard with both
subjective and objective components (Bicks 1977, 303–304). Under this equity-based
immunity standard – as opposed to the rigid “objective baselessness” test mandated by
the Federal Circuit – the government could impose reasonable restrictions on patent
enforcement, enjoining enforcement campaigns when, for instance, the patent holder
conducted no investigation into the alleged acts of infringement (e.g., Besser

Manufacturing 1951), failed to follow its threats with actual lawsuits (e.g., Adriance,
Platt 1903), or falsely claimed that a patent’s validity had previously been confirmed in
court or in reexamination (e.g., A.B. Farquhar Co. 1900). At the same time, cases in
which courts enjoined enforcement conduct under the bad faith standard were usually
egregious and often involved claims that were objectively weak on the merits (e.g.,

Emack 1888). Accordingly, a bad faith immunity standard, as opposed to the Federal
Circuit’s “objective baselessness” rule, would protect patent holders’ ability to provide
legitimate notice of their patent rights while also offering the government some leeway
to punish unfair or deceptive behavior.
If the cases brought against Innovatio by the router manufacturers and against
MPHJ by the Nebraska attorney general had been decided under a bad faith standard,
the courts could have held the patent holders’ enforcement tactics to be unlawful. In
both cases, the claims challenging those tactics failed because they did not allege that
the infringement allegations were objectively baseless. Under a more flexible bad faith
standard, however, the courts likely could have condemned the patent holders’
enforcement activities. For instance, it is extremely unlikely that Innovatio and MPHJ
investigated the alleged acts of infringement, given that they sent out thousands of
demand letters at one time. Moreover, Innovatio made allegedly false statements that its
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patents’ validity had been upheld in court and in reexamination, and MPHJ never sued
the targets of its enforcement campaign. Historically, this is the type of enforcement
conduct that courts held to be in bad faith. Thus, a change of course by the Federal
Circuit could make a real difference to private plaintiffs and government officials who
seek to challenge unfair or deceptive patent enforcement campaigns.

6.4 Regulating Patent Assertions: A Look into the
Future
Although the Federal Circuit’s immunity doctrine is a significant obstacle to
meaningfully regulating patent assertions, it is quite possible that the court will
reconsider that doctrine, particularly if it confronts a case involving a mass enforcement
campaign by a bottom-feeder troll. Regardless of what the Federal Circuit does, from a
legislative perspective, a model of state-federal cooperation is the ideal way to regulate
patent assertions.

6.4.1 Federal Circuit Reconsideration of Its Immunity
Doctrine
If, as the Federal Circuit claims, the First Amendment mandates broad immunity
for patent holders, it might appear as if there is little that governments – state or federal
– can do to regulate patent assertions. It is not, however, a forgone conclusion that the
Federal Circuit will stick to its “objective baselessness” test. Congress’s interest in
patent demand letters could encourage the Federal Circuit to revise its immunity
doctrine. The Federal Circuit keeps close watch when Congress considers amending
patent law and has on numerous occasions altered its case law to align with proposed
18

legislation (Anderson 2014, 966–969; Gugliuzza 2013, 1827–1828). For instance, in the
mid-to-late 2000s, Congress considered several bills to restrict plaintiffs’ choice of
venue in patent cases. While those bills were pending, the Federal Circuit – for the first
time ever – ordered a district court to transfer a patent case to a more convenient venue
(TS Tech 2008). After that initial decision, the Federal Circuit issued several more
opinions ordering transfer (see Gugliuzza 2012, 346). To date, the patent venue statute
remains unchanged, and subsequent proposals to revise venue law in patent cases have
made little progress (see, e.g., Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE)
Act 2016; TC Heartland 2016).
Likewise, during roughly the same time period, Congress was considering
proposals to limit damages in patent cases. While those proposals were pending, the
Federal Circuit issued several decisions increasing its scrutiny of damage awards. For
instance, the court conducted a close review of the facts supporting a jury’s royalty
calculation, overturning a nearly $358 million award against Microsoft as unsupported
by the evidence (Lucent 2009). The court also rejected the much-maligned “25 percent
rule of thumb” as a starting point for the hypothetical negotiation used to calculate a
reasonable royalty (Uniloc 2011).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has, in two cases in past three years, overturned
Federal Circuit case law that, like the court’s immunity doctrine for patent assertions,
extended Noerr’s objective/subjective test beyond its original antitrust context. In

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. (2014), the Supreme Court abrogated
Federal Circuit case law holding that (with some exceptions) a court could award
attorneys’ fees against a losing defendant in a patent case only if the prevailing party
proved, by clear and convincing evidence, both that the litigation was objectively
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baseless and that it was pursued in subjective bad faith (id. p. 1754). Instead, the
Supreme Court adopted a flexible standard that considers both the “substantive
strength of the party’s litigating position” and the “manner in which the case was
litigated” (id. p. 1756).
Similarly, in Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. (2016), the Supreme
Court overturned Federal Circuit case law holding that, to recover enhanced damages
for patent infringement, the patent holder had to prove, by clear and convincing
evidence, both that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood of
infringement and that the accused infringer knew or should have known of the risk of
infringement (id. p. 1928). The Supreme Court again replaced this objective/subjective
test with a flexible standard, holding that courts should exercise their discretion to
award enhanced damages as a “punitive” sanction for “egregious” infringement
behavior (id. p. 1932).
In short, the fact that Congress is considering legislation to regulate patent
demand letters, coupled with Supreme Court’s repeated rejection of the Federal
Circuit’s expansion of Noerr’s objective/subjective test, could (and should) spur the
Federal Circuit to reconsider its immunity doctrine.

6.4.2 State-Federal Cooperation
Separate and apart from the question of whether the Federal Circuit should relax
its immunity doctrine is the question of whether patent assertions should be regulated
by state governments or the federal government. Drawing on a pragmatic, functional
conception of cooperative federalism (see generally Hills 1998), it seems that both state
governments and federal governments should play a role in this area.

20

Congress could, if it chose to do so, expressly preempt state laws governing
patent assertions pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. A single, federal statute on patent
enforcement would have the benefit of providing a uniform legal standard to govern all
patent enforcement activities undertaken anywhere in the country. A uniform standard
would, in theory, allow patent holders to better predict whether their actions are lawful
or not.
But the benefits of legal uniformity should not be overstated. Several scholars
have questioned whether uniformity is a sufficiently important policy goal in the patent
system that it should outweigh the benefits of interjurisdictional dialogue and
experimentation (see, e.g., Gugliuzza 2014, 48–51; Nard and Duffy 2007, 1623; Ouellette
2015, 74). Indeed, state-by-state regulation in the realm of patent enforcement may
have significant deterrence value. Rather than defending against one investigation
brought by the Federal Trade Commission, a patent holder might be forced to defend
against multiple lawsuits in multiple states, brought by both private plaintiffs and state
attorneys general.
State law enforcement agencies also provide substantial enforcement resources.
Dozens of states’ attorneys general offices, joining together, could monitor and punish
deceptive patent enforcement behavior better than the federal government. State
governments are also more accessible than the federal government to the small
businesses, nonprofits, and local governments most likely to be targeted by bottom
feeders. Vermont’s pathmarking statute, for instance, was the product of a grassroots
effort. Businesses and non-profits in the state that had received spurious demand letters
approached their state legislators and attorney general and, together, they drafted
Vermont’s statute (Gugliuzza 2015, 1590–1591).
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An approach to regulating patent assertions that emphasizes the comparative
advantages of state governments and the federal government would be optimal. One
clear strength of federal regulation – which has not been widely discussed by
policymakers or in the academic literature – is that it could provide certainty about
which courts can hear cases involving unfair or deceptive patent assertions. The federal
district courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over cases “arising under”
patent law, meaning that state courts cannot hear those cases. But difficult questions
occur when a plaintiff asserts a state-law claim that implicates federal patent law
(Gugliuzza 2014, 30–35), such as the Vermont attorney general’s consumer protection
lawsuit against MPHJ. MPHJ was able to delay that suit for nearly a year by arguing that
the state had improperly filed the case in state court (MPHJ 2014). Congress could enact
a federal statute governing patent assertions that – without question – placed claims
under the statute within the federal courts’ exclusive subject matter jurisdiction.
A federal statute governing patent assertions could also reduce uncertainty on
matters of personal jurisdiction. The courts of a particular state may exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts” with
that state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice” (International Shoe 1945, 316). Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the personal jurisdiction of a federal court is typically the same
as the jurisdiction of the courts of the state in which the federal court sits (Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A)). The Federal Circuit has held that a patent holder who
merely sends cease-and-desist letters into a state does not subject itself to personal
jurisdiction in that state (Red Wing Shoe 1998, 1361; see generally La Belle 2010). This
rule enables litigants such as MPHJ to argue that the act of sending demand letters into

22

Vermont is not sufficient to allow a court sitting in Vermont – state or federal – to
exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Under that reading of the Federal Circuit’s case
law, any litigant who wishes to challenge MPHJ’s demand letter practices must travel to
the company’s state of incorporation (Delaware) or principal place of business (likely
Texas).
Congress, however, has the power to authorize the federal courts to exercise
personal jurisdiction on a nationwide basis (see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(k)(1)(C)). Thus, a federal statute on unfair or deceptive patent assertions could
ensure that a patent holder who blankets the country with letters can be sued in any
federal district court in the United States. To take a slightly more tailored approach,
Congress could, alternatively, create personal jurisdiction in any district into which a
patent holder sent demand letters.
Given the respective strengths of state governments and the federal government,
the regulatory regime in the proposed federal TROL Act is a reasonable starting point.
The Act condemns various types of misleading or deceptive communications made in
connection with the enforcement of a federal patent. It also preempts state statutes
regulating patent enforcement and instead allows state attorneys general to enforce the
federal statute. The regime imagined by the TROL Act thus capitalizes on the federal
government’s ability to provide substantive uniformity as well as the states’
enforcement capabilities and responsiveness to the citizens, businesses, and
organizations most likely to receive unfair or deceptive patent demand letters.
The TROL Act, however, could be improved in at least two ways. First, the Act
goes into too much detail defining prohibited behavior, listing at least seventeen
different acts that are illegal under the statute. Because patent enforcement tactics
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constantly evolve, Congress would do better to simply outlaw “bad faith” acts in patent
enforcement and let the courts and the FTC apply that standard on a case-by-case basis.
Although one might insist that Congress needs to make clear precisely what conduct is
illegal, the long line of pre-Federal Circuit case law discussed above provides ample
guidance about whether enforcement conduct is in good faith or bad faith. A
complicated statutory definition of prohibited acts risks obscuring the basic, equitable
purpose of imposing limits on patent enforcement activities (cf. Posner 2013, 86–87
(critiquing complex, multifactor legal tests because they obscure the purpose of the
relevant law)).
Second, the TROL Act as currently drafted does not provide the jurisdictional
clarity that Congress is well-situated to create. The Act would preempt only state
statutes that specifically regulate patent enforcement; it would not preempt state
consumer protection laws, state laws relating to acts of fraud or deception, or state tort
law. Private plaintiffs and state law enforcement officials would continue to rely on
those bodies of state law to challenge acts of patent enforcement. As discussed, patent
holders can plausibly argue that state-law claims challenging the enforcement of a
federal patent fall within the federal courts’ exclusive subject matter jurisdiction. This is
particularly true if the patent holder answers the complaint with a counterclaim seeking
a declaratory judgment that the relevant state law is unconstitutional under the Federal
Circuit immunity case law discussed above (see Biotechnology Industry Organization
2007, 1368 (holding that a claim seeking a declaratory judgment that a state law is
preempted by federal patent law is subject to the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction);
see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (extending the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction to cases
in which patent-law issues appear only in a counterclaim)). Alternatively, if the patent
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holder is sued in federal court, it can emphasize a recent Supreme Court decision
suggesting that most state-law claims that involve embedded issues of patent validity or
infringement (such as an analysis under one of the new state statutes of whether
infringement allegations in a demand letter were meritorious) do not fall within the
federal courts’ exclusive subject matter jurisdiction (Gunn 2013).
One way to make clear that civil cases challenging patent enforcement must be
filed in federal court would be to preempt all relevant state laws regulating patent
enforcement, not just the new state statutes (which is the approach of the TROL Act),
and to specify that claims under the federal statute must be filed in federal court. But, by
expressly preempting all state laws regulating patent enforcement, Congress would
eliminate the ability of private parties to bring civil actions challenging enforcement
conduct, for the TROL Act, as currently drafted, allows enforcement only by the FTC and
by state attorneys general.
Yet private enforcement can be an important complement to proceedings
brought by government officials. Not only are private parties more directly affected by
and better aware of unfair or deceptive assertions of infringement, the possibility of a
counterclaim can provide important leverage to a small organization or business in
fighting back against a bottom feeder, as illustrated by a recent suit commenced by the
non-profit Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) on behalf of a business targeted by
Shipping & Transit LLC (formerly known as ArrivalStar), a notorious NPE (see
Electronic Frontier Foundation 2016). That suit seeks not only a declaration that
Shipping & Transit’s patents are invalid and not infringed, it also seeks actual and
punitive damages under Maryland’s new statute governing demand letters. That suit
challenging the validity of several patents that have been asserted against hundreds of
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individuals and organizations may not have been filed but for the additional incentives
provided by the private civil claim available under Maryland law. Thus, if the TROL Act
were amended to preempt all state laws governing patent assertions, it should also be
amended to permit private parties to pursue claims under the statute in federal court.
In addition to providing no clarity on matters of subject matter jurisdiction, the
TROL Act is also silent on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Consequently, cases under
the statute could be filed only in federal courts in states in which the patent holder is
subject to personal jurisdiction. Because the act of sending a demand letter into a state
is, by itself, insufficient to create personal jurisdiction, the number of venues for suits
against patent holders who violate the statute is potentially quite small. EFF, for
example, was forced to file its recent suit in Florida – the patent holder’s home state –
even though the case involved demand letters sent to a small business in Maryland and
claims under Maryland law (see id.). Congress could, by statute, sensibly expand the
federal courts’ personal jurisdiction in cases involving demand letters to allow a
recipient to file suit in the state into which the patent holder sent the letter.

6.5 Conclusion
Under the Federal Circuit’s current case law, no government body – state or
federal; legislative, administrative, or judicial – will be able to meaningfully police unfair
or deceptive patent enforcement. As this chapter has shown, however, the broad
immunity the Federal Circuit has conferred on patent holders provides too much leeway
for manipulation and harmful tactics. Returning to the equitable, good faith immunity
standard would respect a patent holder’s right to make legitimate allegations of
infringement while not shielding the extortionate schemes recently deployed by
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bottom-feeder trolls. Under a good faith standard, both the states and the federal
government could play a useful role in regulating patent assertions. An ideal regime
would allow states (and private parties) to capitalize on their superior enforcement
capabilities, with the federal government providing a uniform substantive standard and
clarifying the vexing jurisdictional matters that arise in legal challenges to patent
enforcement conduct.
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